2012年CATTI一級(jí)筆譯英譯漢真題

　　原文：

　　No one can lay claim to so much influence on the shaping of foreign policy over the past 50 years as Henry Kissinger. In and out of office, he has been intelligently ubiquitous. Almost two decades have passed since the publication of Diplomacy, a masterly study of the subject that will long endure as a bible for all who believe that nation states remain the principal building blocks in international politics, whatever the human aspirations towards international co-operation.

　　Now, with On China, Kissinger has turned his mind to a subject on which he has a unique vantage point. Publishers must have drooled at the prospect of this guru from the last century writing about the rising global power of the present one, especially given his own role in helping to open it up to the world.

　　For Henry Kissinger, ancient China was a subtle place. That in turn led to its special resonance in the present: “In no other country,” he writes, “is it conceivable that a modern leader would initiate a major national undertaking by invoking strategic principles from a millennium-old event,” as Mao often did in discussing policy matters. And Mao “could confidently expect his colleagues to understand the significance of his allusions.” How could it not be so? For “Chinese language, culture, and political institutions were the hallmarks of civilization, such that even regional rivals and foreign conquerors adopted them to varying degrees as a sign of their own legitimacy.” “Strategic acumen” shaped China’s earliest international policies; and to support its central position it could call on a remarkable series of potential followers and aides.

　　A good example was the Chinese scholar known in the West as Confucius, who taught by citing examples to a small group of loyal and dedicated students. They reciprocated by drawing on their conversations for practical examples that could create a legacy on his behalf—forming a canon that Kissinger describes as “something akin to China’s Bible and its Constitution combined.” Whereas in the Western world “balance-of-power diplomacy was less a choice than an inevitability,” and “no religion retained sufficient authority to sustain universality,” for China foreign contacts did not form “on the basis of equality.”

　　Kissinger’s reflections about the Western and Chinese concepts of strategy lead him to posit a stark distinction, one in which “the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage,” while “the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces.” It is a good way for Kissinger to prepare the reader for a dualistic approach to two vast philosophical and military traditions, which he begins by summarizing the key differences between the Chinese players of the board game weiqi (the Japanese go) and those favoring the contrasting game of chess. While chess is about the clash of forces, about “decisive battle” and the goal of “total victory,” all of which depend on the full deployment of all the pieces of the board, weiqi is a game of relative gain, of long-range encirclement, which starts with an empty board and only ends when it “is filled by partially interlocking areas of strength.”

　　Teachers and practitioners of grand strategy have studied these contrasts between the two for many centuries. The principles of weiqi are echoed in the haunting text known as The Art of War, by a certain Master Sun, writing around the same time as Confucius. Kissinger quotes Sun at some length, drawing especially on his insights into the concepts of “indirect attack” and “psychological combat.”

　　譯文：

　　過去50年間，在外交政策的形成方面影響最大者，莫過于亨利•基辛格(Henry Kissinger)。無論在朝還是在野，基辛格的身影無處不在，這當(dāng)屬明智�！洞笸饨弧�(Diplomacy)一書出版至今，已近二十載。其中有一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)：無論人類多么渴望國際合作，國家仍將是國際政治基石。在信奉這一觀點(diǎn)的人心目中，基辛格這本研究外交的經(jīng)典著作，堪稱一部經(jīng)久不衰的“圣經(jīng)”。

　　如今，憑借《論中國》(On China)一書，基辛格將思想轉(zhuǎn)向了另一個(gè)話題，在這個(gè)問題上，他有著獨(dú)特的發(fā)言權(quán)�？梢钥隙�，從上世紀(jì)起，出版商們就在巴望著這位大師能寫一寫這個(gè)當(dāng)時(shí)已開始崛起、如今還在繼續(xù)崛起的新興大國，特別是考慮到基辛格的特殊身份——他幫助世界打開了中國的大門。

　　《論中國》一書的核心內(nèi)容，講述的是1972年美國總統(tǒng)理查德•尼克松(Richard Nixon)和基辛格(時(shí)任美國國家安全顧問)的中國之行，以及基辛格訪問前所做的秘密準(zhǔn)備。在書中，基辛格對(duì)中國歷史進(jìn)行了簡單回顧，剖析了會(huì)見過的幾位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的性格，并詳細(xì)描述了會(huì)面時(shí)的細(xì)節(jié)�；�辛格總結(jié)了近年來中國所取得的成就，就民主價(jià)值觀(或曰普世價(jià)值)與外交實(shí)務(wù)之間的關(guān)系表達(dá)了一些總體看法，并毫不出人意料地表示：他對(duì)美國與這個(gè)世界第一人口大國合作的前景充滿期待。

　　從很多方面來看，《論中國》是基辛格對(duì)其畢生追求的一些要?jiǎng)?wù)的辯解。盡管基辛格提到了美國對(duì)多元主義、民主和人權(quán)近乎宗教般的執(zhí)著，但他同時(shí)辯稱，這些合理關(guān)注不應(yīng)妨礙對(duì)于國家利益的追求，而在40年的時(shí)間里，與中國恢復(fù)邦交一直符合美國的國家利益。此外，在謀求與中國恢復(fù)友好邦交的初始階段，另一個(gè)額外好處(同時(shí)也的確是動(dòng)機(jī)之一)就是：孤立蘇聯(lián)(Soviet Union)。近年來，在美國忙于處理各種國際事務(wù)之際，中國常常采取配合的姿態(tài)，比如在伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭之前，相對(duì)于美國一些討厭的歐洲盟友，中國反而顯得“更加合作”。

　　基辛格在書中寫道：“評(píng)判政治家，要看他們能否長期堅(jiān)持其理念�！碑�(dāng)然，基辛格非常樂于提到一點(diǎn)：他很早就意識(shí)到一個(gè)繁榮、開放的中國對(duì)世界有利�？梢岳斫�，他認(rèn)為對(duì)人權(quán)問題的過度關(guān)注不應(yīng)干擾嚴(yán)肅的外交，或許事實(shí)證明這一看法是正確的，但最近中東的事態(tài)發(fā)展卻傾向于得出相反的結(jié)論。關(guān)于民主，最終并不存在什么“阿拉伯例外”，或許也不存在什么“中國例外”，近來中國安全機(jī)構(gòu)的所作所為，似乎也印證了這一點(diǎn)。

　　熱點(diǎn)關(guān)注：2018-2011年翻譯資格考試高級(jí)筆譯真題