I want your money 我要用的就是你的錢

　　Sep 25th 2008

　　From The Economist print edition

　　No government bail-out of the banking system was ever going to be pretty. This one deserves support

　　政府對(duì)銀行系統(tǒng)的救助永遠(yuǎn)不可能完美，但當(dāng)下的這個(gè)理應(yīng)得到支持。

　　SAVING the world is a thankless task. The only thing beyond dispute in the $700 billion plan of Hank Paulson, the treasury secretary, and Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, to stem the financial crisis is that everyone can find something in it to dislike. The left accuses it of ripping off taxpayers to save Wall Street, the right damns it as socialism; economists disparage its technicalities, political scientists its sweeping powers. The administration gave ground to Congress, George Bush delivered a televised appeal and Barack Obama and John McCain suspended the presidential campaign. Even so, as The Economist went to press, the differences remained. There was a chance that Congress would say no.

　　拯救世界是一個(gè)費(fèi)力不討好的任務(wù)。財(cái)長(zhǎng)鮑爾森和聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席伯南克為了阻止金融危機(jī)而主張了7000億美元救助計(jì)劃，其中只有一點(diǎn)是毋庸置疑的：每個(gè)人都能從該計(jì)劃中挑出些毛病來(lái)(不可能讓每個(gè)人都滿意—)。左翼勢(shì)力控訴該計(jì)劃無(wú)異于搶劫納稅人的錢財(cái)去救助華爾街，右翼勢(shì)力譴責(zé)該計(jì)劃為社會(huì)主義運(yùn)動(dòng);經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家鄙視計(jì)劃的學(xué)術(shù)性，政治科學(xué)家崇拜它橫掃一切的強(qiáng)大威力。執(zhí)政當(dāng)局向國(guó)會(huì)進(jìn)行了妥協(xié)：布什發(fā)出了電視呼吁，奧巴馬和麥凱恩也暫停了競(jìng)選大戰(zhàn)。即使如此，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人雜志在付印時(shí)分歧仍在(還是保留了異見(jiàn))。國(guó)會(huì)曾經(jīng)是有機(jī)會(huì)拒絕該計(jì)劃的。

　　Spending a sum of money that could buy you a war in Iraq should not come easily; and the notion of any bail-out is deeply troubling to any self-respecting capitalist. Against that stand two overriding arguments. First this is a plan that could work (see article). And, second, the potential costs of producing nothing, or too little too slowly, include a financial collapse and a deep recession spilling across the world: those far outweigh any plausible estimate of the bail-out’s cost.

　　花掉相當(dāng)于伊戰(zhàn)軍費(fèi)規(guī)模的一大筆銀子不應(yīng)該如此輕松，況且救助的理念令任何一個(gè)有自尊心的資本家都感到非常不安。但針對(duì)上述論調(diào)有兩大主要反對(duì)觀點(diǎn)：第 一，這是一個(gè)可能行之有效的方案;第二，那些毫無(wú)效果或者收效甚微的潛在支出已經(jīng)大大超過(guò)了救援計(jì)劃合理的成本預(yù)測(cè)，上述支出包括蔓延全球的金融崩潰和經(jīng) 濟(jì)萎縮所招致的損失。

　　Mr Market goes to Congress

　　讓國(guó)會(huì)來(lái)判決市場(chǎng)

　　America’s financial system has two ailments: it owns a huge amount of toxic securities linked to falling house prices. And it is burdened by losses that leave it short of capital (although the world has capital, not enough has been available to the banks). For over a year, since August 2007, central bankers, principally Mr Bernanke, have been trying to make this toxic debt liquid. But by September 17th, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the nationalisation of American International Group earlier that week, the problem started to become one of the system’s solvency too. The market lost faith in a strategy that saved finance one institution at a time. The economy is not healing itself. If credit markets stay blocked, consumers and firms will enter a vicious spiral.

　　美國(guó)金融體系微恙有二：過(guò)量持有與狂跌房?jī)r(jià)相關(guān)的有毒債券;損失的負(fù)擔(dān)致使體系內(nèi)呈現(xiàn)出資本短缺(盡管全球擁有很多資本，但是銀行可用部分確嚴(yán)重不足)。 自2007年8月以來(lái)的一年時(shí)間里，以伯南克為主要代表的央行一直致力于有毒債務(wù)的清償。但截止到9月17日，緊隨雷曼兄弟的破產(chǎn)和美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的國(guó)有 化，該難題發(fā)展成了金融體系清償能力的麻煩之一。市場(chǎng)對(duì)于采取逐個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)救助的方法來(lái)挽救金融體系的策略已經(jīng)失去了信心，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)自救。如果信貸 市場(chǎng)依然一片僵局，消費(fèi)者和公司必將卷入更為兇殘的漩渦。

　　Mr Paulson’s plan relies on buying vast amounts of toxic securities. The theory is that in any auction a huge buyer like the federal government would end up paying more than today’s prices, temporarily depressed by the scarcity of buyers, and still buy the loans cheaply enough to reflect the high chance of a default. That would help recapitalise some banks—which could also set less capital aside against a cleaner balance sheet. And by creating credible, transparent prices, it would at last encourage investors to come in and repair the financial system: this week Warren Buffett and Japan’s Mitsubishi-UFJ agreed to buy stakes in Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Some banks would still not have enough capital, but under Mr Paulson’s original plan, the state could put equity in them, or, if they become insolvent, take them over and run them down.

　　鮑爾森先生的計(jì)劃依賴于大量購(gòu)買有毒債券，其理論依據(jù)在于：在任何競(jìng)價(jià)中，買家數(shù)量匱乏會(huì)造成價(jià)格的暫時(shí)性壓低，雖然像聯(lián)邦政府這樣的大買家所付出的成交 價(jià)格很可能高于現(xiàn)值，但仍然會(huì)以易于形成違約的便宜價(jià)格購(gòu)買貸款。此舉不僅可以調(diào)整一些銀行的資本，還可以減少為了調(diào)整資產(chǎn)負(fù)債比例而擱置的資本。建立可 靠透明的價(jià)格將會(huì)最終鼓勵(lì)投資者們重新進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)并且修復(fù)金融體系：本周巴菲特和日本三菱UFJ銀行同意購(gòu)買高盛和摩根斯坦利的股份。一些銀行還處于資本不足的狀態(tài)，但是根據(jù)鮑爾森計(jì)劃的原意，國(guó)家可以向銀行注資，如果他們出現(xiàn)了清償問(wèn)題，政府可以接管銀行并阻止其繼續(xù)惡化。

　　The economics behind this is sound. Government support to the banking system can break the cycle of panic and pessimism that threatens to suck the economy into deep recession. Intervention may help taxpayers, because they are also employees and consumers. Although $700 billion is a lot—about 6% of GDP—some of it will be earned back and it is small compared with the 16% of GDP that banking crises typically swallow and trivial compared with the Depression, when unemployment surged above 20% (compared with 6% now). Messrs Bernanke and Paulson also have done well by acting quickly: it took seven years for Japan’s regulators to set up a mechanism to take over large broke banks in the 1990s.

　　支撐該計(jì)劃的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)健康度還算好，政府對(duì)于銀行系統(tǒng)的支持可以打破人們對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)深陷衰退所產(chǎn)生的恐慌和悲觀的惡性循環(huán)。政府干預(yù)也許會(huì)幫到納稅人，因?yàn)樗?們本身也是雇員和消費(fèi)者。盡管7000億美元是一個(gè)不小的數(shù)目，幾乎相當(dāng)于GDP的6%，但是其中的部分時(shí)可以被拿回的，并且與銀行危機(jī)所吞噬掉的GDP 的16%比較而言就小了很多;如果與上世紀(jì)的大蕭條相比就更是微不足道了，那時(shí)候的失業(yè)率飚升到20%，而現(xiàn)在只有6%。鮑爾森和伯南克也做到了該出手時(shí) 就出手：日本的立法者在90年代時(shí)用了7年時(shí)間才建立了接管破產(chǎn)銀行的機(jī)制。

　　Could the plan be better structured? Some economists want the state to focus on putting equity into the banks—arguing that it is the best way to address their lack of solvency. In theory you would need to spend less, because a dollar of new equity would support $10 in assets. Yet the banks might not take part until they were on the ropes and, if house prices later fell dramatically more, the value of the banks’ shares would collapse. The threat of the government taking stakes would scare off some private investors. And in the charged atmosphere after this bail-out meddling politicians, as part-owners, would have a tempting lever over the banks.

　　這個(gè)計(jì)劃得架構(gòu)是否可以更優(yōu)化呢?一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家希望政府可以向銀行注入更多的資本，因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)為這是清償能力缺乏的最佳解決之道。理論上而言應(yīng)該減少消 費(fèi)，因?yàn)樽①Y1美元可以支撐10美元的資產(chǎn)。然而銀行存在著不撞南墻不回頭的心理，那么如果房?jī)r(jià)隨后會(huì)更夸張地下跌，銀行股票將會(huì)徹底崩潰。政府介入行為 所引發(fā)的恐慌也許會(huì)嚇跑部分私人投資者。政客們的干預(yù)計(jì)劃造成了非常緊張的氣氛，所以股東們有躲避銀行的傾向。

　　Mr Paulson’s plan also has its shortcomings. He will find it hard to stop sellers from rigging auctions, if only because no two lots of dodgy securities are exactly the same. Taxpayers may thus pay over the odds and banks may be rewarded for their stupidity. Yet these costs seem small against the benefit of putting a floor under the markets. And fine calculations about moral hazard are less pressing when investors are fleeing risk.

　　鮑爾森先生的計(jì)劃也有弱點(diǎn)：該計(jì)劃很難阻止賣方的提價(jià)行為，除非有兩個(gè)完全一樣的dodgy securities(這個(gè)我沒(méi)有查到)。納稅人會(huì)因?yàn)椴粚?duì)等的條件而要支付更多成本，而銀行會(huì)從他們的愚蠢舉動(dòng)中獲利。投資者在規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的時(shí)候，道德風(fēng) 險(xiǎn)的精準(zhǔn)計(jì)算就不那么重要了。

　　If the economics of Mr Paulson’s plan are broadly correct, the politics are fiendish. You are lavishing money on the people who got you into this mess. Sensible intervention cannot even buy long-term relief: the plan cannot stop house prices falling and the bloated financial sector shrinking. Although the economic risk is that the plan fails, the political risk is that the plan succeeds. Voters will scarcely notice a depression that never happened. But even as they lose their houses and their jobs, they will see Wall Street once again making millions.

　　如果鮑爾森先生計(jì)劃的經(jīng)濟(jì)效果還勉強(qiáng)的話，那么其政治效果就應(yīng)該算是極差了;因?yàn)殄X已經(jīng)揮霍到把你帶入混亂的人的身上了。如此理性的干預(yù)甚至都不能換來(lái)長(zhǎng) 期的緩解：該計(jì)劃不能阻止房?jī)r(jià)的下跌和過(guò)度膨脹金融業(yè)的縮水，經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)在于計(jì)劃的失敗，而政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)在于計(jì)劃的成功。選民們不會(huì)注意到一個(gè)永遠(yuǎn)不可能發(fā)生的 經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，盡管目前失去了房屋和工作，但他們還將看到華爾街的東山再起。

　　Buckle a little, but do it briefly

　　政策緊縮一些，而且要快

　　In retrospect, Mr Paulson made his job harder by misreading the politics. His original plan contained no help for homeowners. And he assumed sweeping powers to spend the cash quickly. He was right to want flexibility to buy a range of assets. But flexibility does not exclude accountability. As complaints mounted, Mr Paulson and Mr Bernanke buckled—agreeing, for instance, to more oversight. Now that Messrs McCain and Obama have returned to Congress to forge a deal, more buckling may be necessary. Ideally, concessions should not outlast the crisis: temporary help for people able to stay in their houses, a brief ban on dividends in financial firms, even another fiscal package. They should not be permanent or so onerous that the programme fails for want of participants—which is why proposed limits on pay are a mistake (see article).

　　回顧過(guò)往，鮑爾森先生對(duì)政治的錯(cuò)誤解讀給自己的工作平添了不少難度。他的計(jì)劃原本不包括對(duì)房屋所有者的救助，并且假想出可以迅速作出支出的強(qiáng)大權(quán)利。他對(duì) 于購(gòu)買資產(chǎn)靈活性的需求是正確的，但是靈活性也不能犧牲應(yīng)有的義務(wù)。鑒于抱怨的日益增多，鮑爾森和伯南克決定收緊政策：比如同意加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管。現(xiàn)在麥凱恩和奧 巴馬也同國(guó)會(huì)達(dá)成了進(jìn)一步收緊政策的共識(shí)。在理想主義狀態(tài)下，讓步不會(huì)比危機(jī)延續(xù)更長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間：暫時(shí)幫助人們保住自己的房產(chǎn)，暫時(shí)中斷金融公司的分紅以及其 他一攬子財(cái)政措施。但是這不應(yīng)該是長(zhǎng)期行為，而且也不應(yīng)該太過(guò)繁瑣，否則就會(huì)因?yàn)槿狈�參與者而導(dǎo)致計(jì)劃的失敗;這就是限定支付額度的錯(cuò)誤根源所在。

　　Mr Paulson’s plan is not perfect. But it is good enough and it is the plan on offer. The prospect of its failure sent credit markets once again veering towards the abyss. Congress should pass it—and soon.

　　鮑爾森先生的計(jì)劃并不完美，但已經(jīng)足夠用、并且馬上可以用。失敗的前景會(huì)再一次讓信貸市場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)向深淵，所以國(guó)會(huì)應(yīng)該盡快通過(guò)該方案

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